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There has been a rising number of referendums in the world recently, including referendums on
independence. However, these types of referendums are very unique, as they quite irrevocably
decide about the future of a group of people in the given territory that they occupy. In short,
referendums on independence need to be reconsidered under certain normative and administra-
tive criteria. First, it is not clear whether a referendum or plebiscite should be used. Second, it
is questionable whether the rising number of referendums is tied to crises of legitimacy of con-
temporary regimes and, third, it is also questionable whether referendums are good or bad for
democracy in general. Fourth, the referendum on independence in Scotland and the Brexit refer-
endum in the UK may qualitatively differ from other referendums of such kind. Fifth, there is a
question surrounding why referendums (and potential referendums) on independence in contem-
porary stable democracies (Canada, Spain, the UK vs. Scotland) may have a completely different
constitutional framework? Finally, how should we view certain criteria like a “clear majority”
requirement and the right to vote for diaspora as justifiable for referendums on independence? In
discussion, Přemysl Rosůlek and Matt Qvortrup are seeking answers to these questions.
Matt Qvortrup is Professor of Political Science and International Relations at Coventry Univer-
sity, having previously taught at the LSE, Aberdeen and University College London. An expert
in referendums, European politics and comparative government, Professor Qvortrup was awarded
the PSA Prize in 2013 for his research on political institutions and policy outputs. Matt was a
Specialist Advisor to the House of Commons Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs
Committee. He has previously worked as member of President Obama’s Special Envoy Team in
Africa (2009–2010). His books include Referendums and Ethnic Conflicts (2014), Government by
Referendum (2018) and The Referendum and other Essays on Constitutional Politics (2019).
* * *
Přemysl Rosůlek: To begin with, for a proper definition of the term referendum, some scholars prefer
the term referendum, while a minority of other academicians use the term plebiscite. Finally, some
scholars use both terms interchangeably. What is your opinion on this case? As for the term secession,
some scholars prefer the term secession over the term separation, while some use both words as
synonyms. And, finally, can we use the word secession for both the separation of an entity from a
larger state or also for internal secession, such as the secession of Jura from the Canton of Bern? Is
this notion also acceptable for other manifestations of self-determination? What is your opinion on
the usage of both terms? I’m asking because the term secession has proliferated into cases in which
– as I assume – either break-up (at least states in central Asia which did not want to leave the USSR
until its termination) or demise (the case of division of Czechoslovakia in which neither Czechs nor
Slovaks became a legal successor state to the previous one) would be a more suitable word.
Matt Qvortrup: Let me give you a slightly philosophical answer, if I may? I am a nominalist
and I don’t believe there are ‘true’ definitions, like in the case of Plato’s forms. So, I don’t
think it is wrong to use the terms interchangeably, but the norm is that referendums are votes
held in democracies, whereas plebiscites are votes held in non-free states. Thus, we have had
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referendums in Switzerland, Slovakia and Sweden, but the votes organised in Kazakhstan, Belarus
and Crimea in 2014 – to name but a few – are plebiscites. I do believe, however, that some
referendums have a plebiscitary character. Basically, referendums are when the people have a
choice. A plebiscite is when they’re asked to approve a fait accompli.
Přemysl Rosůlek: You’ve recently published extensive research on secessionist referendums in the
world since the Napoleonic Era. Do you agree with scholars who argue that, quantitatively, there is
a tendency towards a rising number of referendums in general in the world in previous decades (see
Aguiar-Conraria, Magalhães 2010; see also Qvortrup 2014b)? If so, do you think that it can be tied to
the crisis of legitimacy of current political elites – though legally elected – both in liberal democracies
and in former third world countries? Second, there are many scholars that think referendums are good
for democracy (e.g. Ureli 1996; He 2002), while some others disagree with it (e.g. Duchacek 1975:
47). The third group of scholars is convinced of both the positive and negative aspects of referendums
in representative democracies (see Setala 1999: 81). Finally, there are scholars who are undecided as
to whether the referendum is good or bad for democracy (see Gallagher 1996: 244; Walker 2003: 118).
Do you also belong to this fourth group of scholars (see Qvortrup 2014a: 48)?
Matt Qvortrup: I generally think referendums – provided they are conducted fairly and in accor-
dance with human rights – are good for democracy. But referendums have to be a people’s shield,
a way of stopping the politicians for doing things that they do not have a mandate to do. It is
evident that the number of referendums has grown. The main reason – and there are probably
more than one – is that fewer people identify with parties and hence, politicians submit issues to
referendums for fear of losing support. I think this tendency is a healthy one.
Přemysl Rosůlek: In what respect do you perceive referendums on independence in Scotland 2014 and
on secession from the UK in 2016 as quantitatively different from other similar referendums in the
post-Cold-War era?
Matt Qvortrup: Those two referendums were very different. The Scottish referendum was a classic
constitutional referendum; the SNP (Scottish National Party) had won an election but needed a
mandate to carry out a policy they believed in. The 2016 Brexit referendum was a vote to save
the Conservative party from losing votes to UKIP. It was a referendum held for party political
purposes, not one that followed from constitutional principle, nor one the voters demanded. The
EU was a minor issue at the time. The Scottish referendum was an example of what a referendum
ought to be like – the Brexit referendum was not.
Přemysl Rosůlek: In the 1990s, scholars who focused on the normative aspects of secession often
appealed to have secession included into international law. However, the first decade of the 21st
century was less optimistic in terms of this issue. And in fact, the secession of Kosovo from what
remained of Yugoslavia brought pessimism about this international area being suitable for the issue.
Nevertheless, how problematic is it in your eyes that no international instrument for peaceful secession
from liberal democratic states has yet been developed? For example, as the Edinburgh agreement –
negotiated between the Scottish government and HM Government of the UK – paved the way for
the referendum on independence with a simple majority of voters in Scotland only without any other
procedural hurdles, the Supreme Court of Canada (see Supreme Court of Canada 1998) introduced a
rather restrictive way for Quebec to secede if their political representatives wished to secede from the
federation. Most strikingly, the case of Spain vs. Catalonia represents strong condemnation from the
central executive, legislative and judicial authorities, and dozens of Catalan political representatives
faced charges such as rebellion and sedition on trial in Madrid (see BBC 2019). Nevertheless, all
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three countries are full-fledged liberal democratic states. Which of the above-mentioned examples
best follows good democracy – Canada vs. Quebec, the UK vs. Scotland or Spain vs. Catalonia?
Matt Qvortrup: These are tricky questions. As a general rule, referendums have to follow the law.
If it is against the constitution to hold a referendum, then one needs to change the constitution
first. Having said that, the rules can be too rigid. The Spanish/Catalan situation was a result
of many things, no doubt, but its main cause was that the courts were spurred on by the PP
goverment, who counted on the courts’ conservatism. Again, negotiation and an attempt to reach
a compromise is key. In that regard the Edinburgh Agreement (and the agreement in Bougainville
and Papua New Guinea at the time of writing). The Canadian situation in regard to the Re Quebec
Case must be seen in context. The 1995 referendum was not on independence per se, rather it
was on a mandate to negotiate independence. The Supreme Court of Canada did require a ‘clear
mandate’ but that was only in case of a unilateral declaration of independence. It was not, as I
read it, a blanket case for super-majorities (like in Montenegro) or special majority requirements
(like the turnout requirement in South Sudan).
Přemysl Rosůlek: In regard to the chaos after the Brexit referendum, do you think that referendums
on independence or referendums in general will became less popular and attractive in both the inter-
national area or the international environment?
Matt Qvortrup: Perhaps, for those who supported ‘remain’, but not for those who were in favour of
Brexit. In fact, even Macron in France has recently made a case for more referendums, and Renzi
held a referendum (which he lost) a few months after Brexit. Referendums are still a convenient
way of settling a problem for politicians. The overall number has not gone down after Brexit.
Přemysl Rosůlek: I have noticed that you’ve recommended administrative criteria which must be met
by actors to follow good practice in referendums: an independent electoral commission, balanced public
broadcasting, no public funds, grants allocated equally, transparency on expenditures, the right to vote
for displaced voters and voters in diaspora, and no special majority requirements (see Qvortrup 2014a:
137–138). In this respect, did the Brexit referendum clearly show that other special items must also
be included into referendums to be considered as justifiable?
Matt Qvortrup: One may be critical of the result of the Brexit referendum. One may argue that
the voters made a mistake and that – at least on economic grounds – the result was irrational.
However, the Brexit referendum was based on solid regulation; the rules were applied and adhered
to. The Brexit referendum was, from an administrative point of view, a model for other countries
to follow. The problem was not the regulation, but that the voters were more interested in
national sovereignty than in economics. But that was their choice. There was a spirited debate
and both sides had an opportunity to rebut claims. It was just that the ‘Leave’ side fought a
better campaign.
Přemysl Rosůlek: Back to the issue of criteria for good referendums. As already mentioned above, you
defend “no special majority requirements” as justifiable criteria for referendum on secession. Christo-
pher Wellman thinks similarly, pointing to the fact that the legitimacy of states is not determined by
the principle of consent but that states are defined territorially and legitimized through their capacities
to function well and can barely satisfy all their citizens (Wellman 2005: 62). Differently, there is empir-
ical evidence – supporting your view – arguing that the quorum may discourage turnout and promote
boycotts of elections (see Aguiar-Conraria, Magalhães, Vanberg 2015). Contrary to the rules set up
for referendums on Scottish independence, the Brexit referendums or 1999 East Timor referendum on
independence, where no special requirements – backed by electoral commissions – were even under
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consideration, there was quite the opposite (and very sophisticated) argumentation by the Supreme
Court of Canada in the 1998 Reference Re Secession of Quebec. It found out that a clear majority
must be accepted in such a referendum on independence. Subsequently, this judicial judgment was
interpreted by the Parliament of Canada in the Clarity Act (Bill C-20), resulting in the fact that the
50%+1 vote (for independence in Quebec) would not be sufficient. Interestingly, this viewpoint was
backed by some scholars such as Margaret Moore (see 2004: 208, 216). In the case of Montenegro, a
similar judgement backing more than a simple majority was issued by the European Commission for
Democracy by law (Venice Commission) of the Council of Europe in its Opinion on the Compatibility
of the Existing Legislation in Montenegro concerning the Organisation of Referendums with Applicable
International Standards in 2005 (Council of Europe 2005). Why are the scholarly community and insti-
tutions so disunited on this issue? And mainly, do you still back the simply majority of voters in order
to change the status quo in such a significant manner, which includes forming a new, independent
state and the change of borders and citizenship?
Matt Qvortrup: Politics is a subjective business, and law even more so. No doubt scholars use ‘ob-
jective arguments’ to defend personal preferences. For me the main thing is that the vote reflects
the will of the majority. For that reason, I am open to turnout requirements, as in Lithuania,
Italy and Hungary; this ensures that the majority of voters is also closer to the majority of those
entitled to vote. For example, only 37 percent of the eligible British voters actually voted for
Brexit. A turnout requirement will ensure that the issue is salient. Italy is a good example of this.
Přemysl Rosůlek: Your other “administrative” requirement for a good referendum is aimed at the right
to vote for displaced voters and voters in diaspora. However, as you mentioned (see Qvortrup 2015),
voters in both Eritrea and East Timor in 1993 and 1999 respectively had the right to vote even if they
were in diaspora. You seem to justify it only with the reason that they may be out of their country of
origin due to long and violent conflicts there. The case of the referendum on independence in South
Sudan was similar. However, you have equated conditions for referendum on independence in the poor
and rather (albeit not violently) unstable Montenegro in 2006 with “Scots living in England, Wales,
Northern Ireland, or other parts of the world” (Qvortrup 2015: 10), who all were not eligible to vote in
both the 2006 or 2014 referendums. Do you think that this is correct and can we differentiate between
referendums in post-conflict areas from referendums in relatively stable entities?
Matt Qvortrup: I think you are right. One cannot compare Eritrea and East Timor with Mon-
tenegro, and still less with Scotland. Diaspora voting is only relevant in post-conflict societies.
Přemysl Rosůlek: As for criteria for a good referendum related to campaigns, the role of the public, and
mass media including the justifiable allocation of sources into two umbrella (e.g. “yes” and “no” deal)
organizations only, do you think that such rules should be extended into the absence and restriction
of manipulations, hacking and the potential impact of the fake news industry from external forces
such as Russia, which has been quoted in previous referendums? Do you think that the outcome of
referendums can be significantly influenced by an external force? If so, how can such interference be
sanctioned – and can the results of voting be fully cancelled?
Matt Qvortrup: Yes, I think referendums can be influenced – if not decided – from the outside.
That is why regulation of social media is essential. Regulation in most countries has largely
overlooked the fact that newspapers and television is now less important than social media.
Přemysl Rosůlek: As for referendum questions in ballot texts, are you still convinced that, quoting you
exactly, “we have no evidence from qualitative or quantitative research that suggests that the question
mattered” (see Qvortrup 2015: 10)? However, Lord Ascroft Polls found different decision from voters
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if asked differently (see Ascroft 2012). In addition, in the cases of the 2014 and 2016 referendums
in Scotland and the UK respectively, the Electoral Commission tested referendum question on focus
groups and its findings were identified as serious and were applied into the reformulation of both
referendum questions. In particular, the Electoral Commission found that phrasing “Do you agree”
(by the way so far commonly in use) is misbalanced, lacks neutrality, may be viewed by voters as too
personal and can have a tendency to instruct voters to side with the “Yes” option (see The Electoral
Commission 2013: 1). And as for the Brexit referendum, the Electoral commission made even one
step further when it shifted from previous practice and recommended instead of using “yes” and
“no” in ballot texts more extensive formulation in order to reach more neutral – and much clearer –
wording: “Remain a member of the European Union” or “Leave the European Union” (The Electoral
Commission 2015: 40). Do you think that such changes triggered by the Electoral Commission which –
by the way – has worked hard on precise referendum questions since around 2002 (it did not hesitate to
change the established norms coined hitherto in the international environment and by the international
community – e.g. the UN and the EU led referendum missions in Eritrea or Montenegro respectively
where the referendum questions started with the phrases “Do you approve” or “Do you want. . . ” and
ended up with “yes” and “no” options which were both condemned by the Electoral Commission as
misleading)?
Matt Qvortrup: Well, Lord Ascroft based his findings on a poll. But my research is based on actual
referendums. In cases where there are few referendums, and a healthy debate before the vote, the
wording of the question does not seem to matter. People have decided to vote long before they
enter the polling booth.
Přemysl Rosůlek: In conclusion, in the light of the Brexit chaos caused by the referendum (motivations
and results), would you agree with the opinion given by some scholars that it would be most suitable
to organize two binding referendums – initiatory and ratificatory simply for two reasons – in the initial
period of the (first and only) referendum campaign, voters barely know the consequences and have no
power over the final agreement reached. Secondly, there is argumentation that the second referendum
can calm hot heads and bring down the impact of populism and manipulation, which can occur with
significant force if only one referendum is organized?
Matt Qvortrup: I don’t think that two referendums are necessary. The practice of holding two
referendums – the first round to narrow down the choices to two, and then a run-off, has been
practiced in New Zealand. It is kind of like the French electoral system. Here it has worked.
It might work for controversial issues. Brexit is a good example of an issue where we NEED a
second vote. The people did not vote for no-deal; Boris Johnson promised we would remain in the
single market. A referendum on the final deal or the future relationship with Europe is something
I support. I have written about it at length in the New European (see Qvortrup 2018).
Přemysl Rosůlek: Matt, thank you for your answers.
Matt Qvortrup: I’m delighted to be interviewed here. It is a great honour, thank you!
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